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Societal Complexity and 
Moral Development 
A Kenyan Study 
CAROLYN P. EDWARDS 
At the turn of the century, in the wave of evolutionary speculation 
that followed the dissemination of Darwin's ideas, several influen- 
tial Western philosophers attempted to link the evolution of 
human society to the progress of morals. Authors such as Herbert 
Spencer (1899), L. T. Hobhouse (1906), and John Dewey and James 
Tufts (1908) argued that forms of ethical thought can be ordered 
along an evolutionary dimension from simple to complex. They 
suggested that the human species has ascended this scale as it has 
progressed from the level of social organization of the most prim- 
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itive hunting and gathering societies to the level of the most com- 
plex, large-scale nations. Western Europe represented the pinnacle 
of both ethical development and societal evolution. 
For the last several decades these arguments have generally met 
with disapproval in the social sciences. Anthropologists have 
repudiated what they perceive to be nineteenth-century white- 
supremacist attitudes toward foreign cultures. They prefer to ad- 
here to the doctrine of cultural relativity, according to which there 
is no scientific basis for judging the value systems of different cul- 
tures in terms of ethical superiority and inferiority. A system of 
norms represents the attempt by a people to solve the life and death 
problems of their existence and as such it has validity for that group. 
Because there exist no objective means to measure and scale the 
problems faced by different cultural groups, there exist no standards 
by which to judge one people's solution as ethically superior to 
another's. 
Until recently most developmental psychologists have held a 
theory of childhood socialization which supports the anthropol- 
ogists' position (reviewed by Kohlberg 1971). They have described 
the process of acquiring moral rules as one of internalization of cul- 
tural values. Their theory proposes that as children grow older, 
they absorb or "internalize" the values around them and hence dis- 
play more and more fully the standards of adult society. Socializa- 
tion is the process by which the parent generation transmits its 
values to the younger generation. A corollary to the theory is that 
the moral behavior of individual children cannot be compared ex- 
cept with reference to the value systems of their families. From this 
standpoint, the "more moral" child is simply the one who conforms 
more thoroughly to parental values (for a full discussion of the in- 
ternalization of moral rules, see Aronfreed 1968). This theory grows 
out of the Freudian and behaviorist traditions in psychology. 
An alternative and opposing perspective emerges from the 
cognitive-developmental school. His research growing out of an 
early work of Jean Piaget (1932), Lawrence Kohlberg has disputed 
the view of moralization as internalization of cultural values and 
instead presented a stage theory of moral development (1963, 1969, 
1971). Kohlberg's theory represents a synthesis of ideas from philos- 
ophy and psychology. Its major theoretical forefathers are James 
Mark Baldwin, L. T. Hobhouse, George Herbert Mead, Dewey and 
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Tufts, and Piaget. From Baldwin (1902) came the conception of 
the stages (especially the description of the first two stages) and a 
theory that growth occurs through a process of continual small ad- 
justments-"assimilations" and "accomodations"-which tend to- 
ward a state of homeostasis. From Hobhouse (1906) came the evo- 
lutionary doctrine that links societal evolution to moral progress. 
Mead (1934) provided the idea that increased capacity for taking 
the perspective of others ("role-taking") lies behind moral develop- 
ment. Dewey and Tufts (1908) proposed a three-tiered system of 
"pre-customary, customary, and reflective" levels of morality, which 
are directly analogous to Kohlberg's three levels-"preconvention- 
al, conventional, and principled"-to be described below. Finally, 
from Piaget (1932) came a theory of justice as social reciprocity and 
the method of the clinical interview. Hypothetical moral dilemmas, 
the heart of Kohlberg's method, represent an elaboration of the 
method of questioning which Piaget used with young children. 
Kohlberg's theory is based on a system of six moral judgment 
stages, which are secondarily grouped into three levels. A summary 
of this system is presented in table 1. The preconventional level, 
which includes stages 1 and 2, is the level at which one would ex- 
pect to find most children and some adults in any society. In con- 
trast, the conventional and principled levels contain the four stages 
(stages 3 to 6) more likely to be seen in adults than in children. Al- 
though no statistical estimates exist for the frequency of the four 
upper stages in any adult population, even the United States, it is 
likely that stage 3 is most common, followed by stage 4, and that 
stages 5 and 6 are exceedingly infrequent except among highly 
educated, elite groups. 
In Kohlberg's view, moral judgment develops in an invariant 
order through the sequence of stages. That is, insofar as the child's 
moral reasoning changes, it is transformed from a lower stage to a 
higher stage-without skipping or bypassing any intermediate 
stages. A stage is a network of basic organizing principles for con- 
ducting moral thinking. Its structure provides a framework for all 
aspects of the person's moral reasoning. The judgments found at 
each stage are more complex and differentiated than at the stage 
before it; they involve what are not only logically but also intuitive- 
ly more elaborate modes of decision making. Individual differences 
in moral development appear in the rate at which children progress 
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TABLE 1 
DEFINITION OF THE MORAL STAGES 
I. Preconventional Level 
At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and 
bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or 
the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), 
or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. 
The level is divided into the following two stages: 
Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences 
of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or 
value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning defer- 
ence to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an under- 
lying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being 
stage 4). 
Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of what 
instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. 
Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of 
fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always 
interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch 
my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice. 
II. Conventional Level 
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, 
or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and 
obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal 
expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, sup- 
porting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group 
involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages: 
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. 
Good behavior is what pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There 
is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" be- 
havior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention-"he means well" becomes 
important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice." 
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward author- 
ity, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists 
of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given 
social order for it's own sake. 
III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level 
At this level, there is a dear effort to define moral values and principles that 
have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons 
holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with 
these groups. This level again has two stages: 
Stage 5. The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian 
overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, 
and standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole 
society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and 
opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching con- 
sensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the 
right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis 
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upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of 
changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than 
fieezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order'). Outside the legal realm, free 
agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" 
morality of the American government and constitution. 
Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the 
decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to 
logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are 
abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not 
concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal 
principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of 
respect for the dignity of human beings as Individual persons. 
(From Kohlberg 1971:164-165) 
as well as in their terminal points of development; that is, not all 
children advance equally quickly or ultimately as far as others. 
Little is known about how much development may, or typically 
does, occur during the adult years of life. 
A signal feature of Kohlberg's theory is his assertion that the 
system of stages is culturally universal (Kohlberg 1969). This claim 
is probably valid with respect to the process or sequence of devel- 
opment. Kohlberg proposes that in every cultural setting all of the 
children can be expected to display the same fixed order of stages 
as they grow older. Cross-sectional data from five societies (Kohl- 
berg 1969) as well as longitudinal data from Turkey (Turiel, Kohl- 
berg, and Edwards n.d.) support this hypothesis. Nevertheless, 
while some of the stages have definitely been recorded in the inter- 
views of children from diverse cultures, not all of the stages have 
been so found. Statements representative of the higher moral stages 
seem to be absent from the interviews of children raised in semi- 
literate, relatively isolated peasant villages in Turkey (Turiel, 
Kohlberg, and Edwards n.d.), British Honduras (Gorsuch and 
Barnes 1973), and the Bahamas (White 1975). In contrast, higher 
stage reasoning has been scored in the protocols of urban school 
children from Turkey (Turiel, Kohlberg, and Edwards n.d.), Tai- 
wan, Mexico, and the United States (Kohlberg 1969), as well as 
children from England (Simpson and Graham n.d.). Hence, only 
Kohlberg's lower moral stages have been proved to be universal to 
the cultures thus far sampled (and these include no hunter-gatherer 
groups). The higher stages appear to be culture-specific, just the 
opposite of culturally universal. Therefore, while the sequence of 
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stages in children's development may be invariant from culture to 
culture, only the first several stages in the system likely constitute 
universal modes of reasoning. 
Kohlberg explains the lack of the higher stages in the peasant 
samples through what he calls "a mild doctrine of social evolution- 
ism, such as was elaborated in the classic work of Hobhouse" (Kohl- 
berg 1971:178). Thus, Kohlberg reintroduces the evolutionary doc- 
trine previously discounted. In Kohlberg's view, all environments 
are not expected to promote the development of moral judgment 
equally. Rather, for different cultural settings, there will be differ- 
ent terminal points of development. In other words, the typical or 
modal child in some cultures will develop farther than the modal 
child in other cultures because their social environments affect 
their processes of growth somewhat differently. The critical vari- 
able that determines the terminal point for the children's develop- 
ment within a particular cultural setting is the "complexity" of its 
social and political organization (Kohlberg 1971). The more com- 
plex the institutional arrangements of a particular society, the 
more likely it is that higher stage subjects will be found within that 
society. 
The critical idea here is that the end point of the development 
of moral judgment is related to a structural feature of the social en- 
vironment, namely, the complexity of institutional arrangements. 
Can this be true? If so, the evolutionary implications that Kohlberg 
stresses might not be the finding of central importance. More sig- 
nificant, the moral development evidence suggests one way in which 
cross-cultural differnces in cognitive functioning might be related 
to variation in the pattern of the everyday lives of human beings. 
The sphere of everyday life of interest would include interpersonal 
disagreements and conflicts of claims. The nature of such problems 
might differ systematically among different types of societies, and 
therefore individual modes of conceptualizing moral issues might 
tend to vary also. Several anthropologists and psychologists (e.g. 
Bruner, Oliver, and Greenfield 1966, Horton 1967, Gladwin 1970, 
Cole et al. 1971) have recently debated whether scientific modes of 
reasoning vary from society to society in accordance with differ- 
ences in the kinds of cognitive tasks typically encountered by peo- 
ple in those societies. The cross-cultural research on moral judg- 
ment raises a parallel question and suggests that certain of the 
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mental processes involved in moral judging might correspond to 
the requirements of social life in different parts of the world. 
This paper suggests reasons why the higher stages of moral judg- 
ment are not culturally universal. If certain moral decision modes 
are found only in the protocols of subjects from the developed 
countries or from urban areas in the developing countries, this sug- 
gests that such modes are relevant to problems salient in these 
"complex" social contexts but subordinate in other types of cultur- 
al settings. To be specific, the evidence suggests that stages 1 to 3 
are definitely present among adults whose frame of reference is a 
traditional and isolated peasant village as well as among adults from 
more modern settings. In contrast, the cross-cultural research with 
adult subjects, including the findings reported below, indicates that 
reasoning that is characteristic of stages 4, 5, and 6 is limited to 
educated subjects whose frame of reference is a complex society 
such as a modern national state. If so, a boundary exists between 
stages 3 and 4. This boundary occurs, I would propose, because 
stage 3 is appropriate to the problems of social control and conflict 
resolution in a simple society, whereas stage 4 contains assumptions 
more suitable for the model of a complex society. 
Because stage 4 seems to be the first higher moral stage that is 
definitely not culturally universal, this paper focuses on the differ- 
ences between stages 3 and 4. Using interview data on subjects from 
both modernized and more traditional contexts in Kenya, the paper 
suggests how peoples' differing frames of reference are related to 
differing basic moral concepts. For the more modernized adults in 
this sample, the frame of reference is modern-day Kenya, the de- 
veloping nation; for the more traditional adults, the frame of ref- 
erence remains the local tribal community within Kenya. This 
distinction is shown to be empirically and theoretically related to 
use of stage 4 versus stage 3 moral reasoning.' 
1. Abraham Edel (1968), a philosopher, has made a related suggestion that 
stages 5 and 6 may be culturally specific to constitutional democracies of the 
Western model. This hypothesis could be tested by interviewing adults from 
societies that are as complex as the Western industrial nations but are guided 
by different politicel and economic ideologies (e.g., the USSR or China) . Such 
a study would show whether the most sophisticated moral reasoning in the 
noncapitalist countries assumes the forms defined by Kohlberg as stages 5 and 
6. In the absence of such evidence, this essay limits itself to the extended con- 
sideration of stages 3 and 4 and their relationships to social organization. 
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METHOD 
SAMPLES 
Two samples are considered: first, a group of young men and 
women studying at the University of Nairobi; and second, a group 
of adults and secondary students from seven communities located 
in different parts of Kenya. 
The university sample consists of 52 students (35 male, 17 female) 
whom I interviewed at the University of Nairobi. These students 
constitute an extremely heterogeneous sample in terms of ethnic 
group, age, family background, and major field of study at the uni- 
versity. The majority (35 subjects) were black Africans from all of 
the major tribes represented at the University of Nairobi, while the 
minority (17 subjects) were Asiatics of Indo-Pakistani descent. In 
general, the university subjects were slightly older than most 
United States college students since they ranged in age from 19 to 
31, with a median of 22.2. They came from large families (median 
number of siblings, 6.1) and the majority of their parents had had 
little formal education (median number of years of education for 
mothers, 4.0, for fathers, 6.0). Most of their fathers (29) were sub- 
sistence farmers or manual laborers; others (23) were white-collar 
workers. In one important respect the subjects are outstanding 
members of their age group in Kenya. All of them have proved ex- 
tremely successful at academic work, since only a tiny minority of 
students who enter secondary school are able to pass through the 
stepwise sequence of qualifying examinations that admit students 
to the university system. The university subjects were recruited in 
classes and through personal contacts. Possible subjects were in- 
formed that the purpose of the study was to understand their ideas 
of right and wrong by having them discuss some hypothetical moral 
dilemmas. Each subject received seven shillings for the interview 
(one U.S. dollar). 
The second sample consists of 47 males and 14 females living in 
seven communities in the Central and Western Provinces of Kenya. 
These subjects belonged to five different ethnic groups-four Afri- 
can tribal groups (the Kikuyus, Merus, Kipsigis, and Luyias) and 
one Asian, or Indo-Pakistani, religious sect (the Ismailis). This 
sample is termed the community sample because of the method of 
data collection. Seven University of Nairobi students (4 male, 3 
female) served as the staff of interviewers. The students, upper level 
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majors in the social sciences, had been trained in the technique of 
moral judgment interviewing but were not taught Kohlberg's 
theory of stages (in order that their interview translations and tran- 
scriptions would not be biased). During the December school 
holidays, each of the student interviewers returned home and con- 
ducted interviews with subjects of his or her own ethnic group. 
The interviewer selected as subjects secondary school students (also 
home for vacation) and adults residing in his or her local area.2 
Although the goal for each interviewer was ten subjects, in most 
cases shortage of time prevented full completion of this plan. The 
final community sample consisted of 25 secondary school students 
and 36 adults. 
The adult subjects were all community leaders, that is, men and 
women who might be considered "moral leaders" in their locales. 
Those chosen had reputations as responsible citizens-persons 
noted for giving useful advice and counsel. Most of these subjects 
were officers or members of local civic organizations and church 
groups; a few were also holders of local political office. Because the 
interviewers worked in a variety of communities (ranging from the 
rather traditional rural location of Sigor in Western Province to 
the modern capital city of Nairobi) the subjects whom interviewers 
selected as community leaders varied from nonschooled peasant 
farmers to college-educated school teachers. Approximately half of 
the subjects were farmers or unskilled laborers while the rest held 
white collar jobs (teaching, office work, business management). 
Ages ranged from 23 to 75, with a median of 48. Their median years 
of formal education were 8.5. Twenty-five of the community leaders 
were male, 11 were female. 
The secondary school subjects chosen from the same communi- 
ties serve mainly as a kind of comparison group to the community 
Ieaders. These 25 subjects simply offer a sampling of the moral 
thought and values of the "new generation" in the communities. 
They were students whose homes were near the interviewers; they 
2. The seven communities in which students interviewed were: (1) Githiga 
location, 25 miles from Nairobi (a community of Kikuyu speakers); (2) Meru 
Mwimbi location, 40 miles from Meru (a community of Kimeru speakers); 
(3) Sigor location, 50 miles from Kericho (a community of Kipsigis speakers); 
(4) Idakho location, 12 miles from Kakamega, and (5) North Wanga location, 
50 miles from Kisumu (both communities of Baluyia speakers); (6) Nairobi, 
and (7) Kisumu (two cities in which Ismailis were interviewed). 
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were not selected on the basis of personal characteristics. Some at- 
tended prestige national boarding schools for top students from all 
over Kenya, while others attended schools in their local areas. They 
came fronm all six of the grades (or "forms") of secondary school, 
and they ranged in age from 17 to 27, with a median of 19.6. Be- 
cause it was much easier for the interviewers to locate male than 
female secondary school students, most of the subjects were male 
(21 out of 25). 
THE INTERVIEW 
The moral judgment interview included four hypothetical moral 
dilemmas and a standard set of probing questions.3 Three of the 
dilemmas were standard Kohlberg stories especially adapted for the 
Kenyan setting (dilemmas of Heinz and the Drug, Mercy Killing, 
and the Father-Son Agreement), while the fourth dilemma was 
constructed in Kenya. One of the dilemmas (the fourth) is pre- 
sented in table 2 below. 
TABLE 2 
HYPOTHETICAL MORAL DILEMMA 
Daniel and the School Fees 
A man, Daniel, managed to complete his secondary school education (Form 4) on 
the basis of school fees given him by his brother. Afterwards he married and took his 
wife to live with his parents in the rural area, while he got a job in the city. Eight 
years later, when his first son was ready to go to primary school, his mother and father 
came to him and said, "Your brother who educated you has been in an accident and 
cannot work, so you must now begin to pay for the education of your brother's child." 
This child was the same age as his own son. The man, Daniel, did not have enough 
money to pay school fees for both his own son and his brother's child. His wife said 
he must put his own son first. 
1. What should Daniel do in this situation? Should he put his son or his brother's 
child first? Why? 
2. What obligation does he have to his brother who educated him? 
3. What does he owe his son? 
4. Should he obey his parents in this case? Do you think a grown son has to obey 
all of his parents' wishes? Why, or why not? 
5. What should a grown son do for his parents? 
6. Is it more important to maintain harmonious relations with his wife or with his 
brother and parents? Why? 
7. Would you condemn Daniel if he just moved his wife and children to the city 
and did not pay for the education of his nephew? Why? 
8. Would you yourself expect your eldest children to help their younger brothers 
and sisters with school fees? Why, or why not? 
3. Thirty-one of the university subjects, as well as the entire community 
sample, were presented the full battery of stories 1 to 4. The remaining 21 
university subjects received only two or three of the dilemmas. Statistical com- 
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Interviews of subjects with some secondary level education were 
conducted in English. Interviews of subjects with six or fewer years 
of schooling were conducted in native languages and later trans- 
lated into English by the university students who conducted the 
interviews. 
SCORING AND RELIABILITY 
Interviews were taped and later transcribed. The global method 
(Kohlberg 1972) was followed for scoring. Each subject's full in- 
terview protocol was considered as a whole and assigned the stage 
code (stages 1 to 6) most representative of the overall level of the 
subject's moral reasoning.4 Many subjects, however, could not be 
classified at one single stage because in one or more of the dilemmas 
they presented clear evidence of two adjacent stages, such as stages 
2 and 3 (more than two adjacent stages were not seen in any sub- 
jects). These subjects were classified as intermediate and assigned 
a "mixed" score; for example, a 2(3) score ("major" stage of 2, 
"minor" stage of 3) indicated that the bulk of a subject's discussion 
lay at stage 2, with some secondary amount at stage 3. 
Forty interviews (20 university, 20 community) were indepen- 
dently scored a second time. The Spearman rank-order correlations 
between the two scorers indicated satisfactory reliability (r. = 0.85 
for the university subsample; r8 = 0.83 for the community sub- 
sample). In addition, percentage agreement between the two judges 
attained the levels of 95% and 90%0, respectively, for the two sam- 
ples (here agreement, following Haan, Smith, and Black [1968], has 
been defined as either agreement on the major stage designation or 
simple reversal of the major and minor stage designations). 
parison of the latter group with the other university subjects, however, sug- 
gests that the variable number of dilemmas did not introduce systematic bias 
(either upward or downward) into the moral judgment coding. 
4. To make these judgments, the Issue Scoring Manual (Kohlberg 1972) was 
used. This manual gives detailed descriptions of stages 1 to 6 modes of reason- 
ing with respect to ten fundamental moral "issues" (such as property rights 
and punishment); these issues are defined or conceptualized in characteristical- 
ly different ways at each moral judgment stage. Because all four moral dilemmas 
were designed to elicit ideas about the fundamental "issues," statements made 
by subjects could be compared with statements in the' scoring manual. The 
scorer, reading a subject's interview, recognized stage-typical modes of thought 
and judged into which of the six moral judgment stages a subject's interview 
could best be placed. For example, the scorer classified as stage 1 a subject who 
displayed virtually nothing but stage 1 arguments throughout his interview. 
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RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the distribution of the moral judgment scores 
for the university and community subjects. Frequencies of subjects 
receiving each of the different stage assignments are given. The sub- 
jects with "intermediate" or "mixed" scores are included in the 
mixed categories (e.g., subjects who were intermediate between 
stages 2 and 3 are included in the category Mixed 2-3). 
Table 3 shows that stage 4 reasoning is much more evident among 
the university subjects than the community leaders, although the 
leaders are on the average much older than the university students 
(and have therefore had more time to develop). Among the uni- 
versity students, 31%o of subjects show major or minor stage usage 
of stage 4 reasoning. In contrast, among the community leaders, 
only 1 1% of subjects display any stage 4 reasoning. 
In contrast, stage 3 reasoning is as frequent among the communi- 
ty leaders as among the university students. The two groups are 
quite similar with respect to stage 3 usage, and contrast with the 
secondary subjects, who show much more stage 2 (and mixed stage 
2) reasoning. This higher percentage of stage 2 in the secondary 
sample is not unexpected given the young age of the sample. Thus, 
the community leaders are differentiated from the secondary stu- 
dents with respect to stage 2 usage (a finding probably owing to 
development with age) and are differentiated from the university 
subjects with respect to stage 4 usage (a finding certainly not owing 
to an age factor). 
If age is not a relevant dimension with which to explain the stage 
4 usage difference between the community leaders and university 
students, the question arises as to what could explain it. The critical 
variable certainly cannot be lack of concern with moral questions 
by the community leaders since all of them were noted "moral 
leaders" in their communities. There are at least two conspicuous 
differences, however, between the university students on the one 
hand and the community leaders on the other hand which might 
play a role in the stage 3 versus 4 dimension. The university stu- 
dents have undergone much more formal education and are ori- 
ented much more thoroughly toward professional jobs in the mod- 
em sector of the Kenyan economy than are most of the community 
leaders. That these might be critical variables receives strong sup- 
port from the brief personal sketches presented below of the four 
community leaders who do show stage 4 reasoning: 
TABLE 
3 
FREQUENCY 
DISTRIBUTION 
OF 
THE 
MORAL 
JUDGMENT 
SCORES 
Frequencies 
(and 
percentages) 
of 
subjects, 
by 
sample, 
receiving 
different 
moral 
judgment 
stage 
scores 
Sample 
Stage 
Mixed 
Stage 
Mixed 
Stage 
Mixed 
Stage 
Mixed 
Total 
1 
1-2 
2 
2-3 
3 
3-4 
4 
4-5 
University 
0 
0 
2 
21 
13 
11 
3 
2 
52 
students 
(4%) 
(40%) 
(25%) 
(21%) 
(6%) 
(4%) 
(100%) 
Community 
0 
0 
6 
14 
12 
4 
0 
0 
36 
leaders 
(17%) 
(39%) 
(33%) 
(11%) 
(100%) 
Secondary 
0 
1 
9 
13 
2 
0 
0 
0 
25 
students 
(4%) 
(36)0 
(52%) 
(8%) 
(100%) 
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1. A Luyia man, aged 36, who was teaching primary school in a rural 
area in the Western Province. He had attended 8 years of formal edu- 
cation (primary school only). 
2. A Kimeru man, aged 27, who at the time of the study was on leave 
from his job as bank officer. He had worked in several different prov- 
inces of Kenya in the towns of Kisii, Mombasa, Naivasha, and Nairobi. 
He had attended the renowned Alliance High School in Central Prov- 
ince for six years and then studied for one further year in London. 
3. An Ismaili woman, aged 27, who was working as a chartered secretary 
for a firm in Nairobi. She had attended four years of secondary school 
in Mombasa, Kenya, and then completed the final two years in England. 
She also had attended four years of secretarial college in England. 
4. An Ismaili man, aged 26, who owned a large business in the city of 
Kisumu in Western Province. He had attended four years of secondary 
school in Kisumu, then gone to Bath Technical Institute in England 
for four years altogether, where he obtained a bachelor's degree in 
business administration. 
Notice that both men and women, and members of three of the 
five ethnic groups, are included in this small group. Such diversity 
suggests that neither sex nor ethnic group are the important vari- 
ables underlying the stage 3-stage 4 distinction. Rather, the per- 
sonal sketches suggest that either higher education, professional 
occupational roles, or both, are more important. Such a suggestion 
receives support from the pattern of scores for the full community 
leaders group with respect to both education and occupation versus 
moral stage score. 
Table 4 presents the data for the full community leaders sample. 
The table displays the frequency of the moral stage scores with re- 
spect to subjects' level of education and type of occupation. Subjects 
were categorized as having "primary" level of education if they 
had attended one to eight years of primary school, they were cate- 
gorized at the "secondary" level if they had attended one or more 
years of secondary school, and they were labeled "college" if they 
had attended some type of postsecondary institution (e.g., business 
college). The findings show that education and occupation relate 
positively to the moral judgment scores. Stage 4 reasoning is linked 
to college education and white collar occupation. 
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TABLE 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJECrS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY LEADERS SAMPLE, BY MORAL 
JUDGMENT SCORE VERSUS EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION 
Subject's educational background 
Moral judgment Nonschooled Primary Secondary College 
score 
Stage 2 3 3 0 0 
Mixed 2-3 5 6 2 1 
Stage 3 3 2 5 2 
Mixed 3-4 0 1 0 3 
Subject's occupational type 
Moral judgment Peasant farmer or White collar 
score manual laborer worker 
Stage 2 6 0 
Mixed 2-3 10 4 
Stage 3 4 8 
Mixed 3-4 0 4 
Of course, education and occupation should not be thought of 
as independent factors-they are highly intercorrelated in the 
sample. Some of the community leaders can be considered highly 
"modemnized"-they attended Western-style schools for many years 
and they now occupy white collar jobs in the modem sector of the 
Kenyan economy. They either live in cities or serve as teachers for 
schools in the rural area. Others of the community leaders are much 
more "traditional"-they did not receive much, if -any, Western- 
style schooling and they live in the rural areas where they either 
own farms or do manual work. This latter group of individuals, 
however, should not be thought of as people at the bottom of the 
Kenyan social hierarchy. Within their own village communities 
they are quite eminent; they may be wealthy by local standards and 
they certainly wield power and influence. Within their own frame 
of reference (what might be called the "traditional" sector- of the 
Kenyan economy), they are "big men" and highly respected women. 
DISCUSSION 
The empirical findings suggest that stage 3 may be the highest of 
Kohlberg's moral judgment stages commonly found among "moral 
leaders" in Kenya whose frame of reference is the semitraditional, 
rural village community. Stage 3 may represent the mature moral 
perspective in this type of cultural setting, the face-to-face society. 
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In contrast, stage 4 modes are more frequently expressed by the new 
elite (the university students) whose education and goals make their 
frame of reference modern-day Kenya, the developing nation. 
The trend of these findings is supported by three other cross- 
cultural studies of adult groups. Research in Turkey (Turiel, 
Kohlberg, and Edwards n.d.), Thailand (Batt 1974), and India 
(Parikh 1975) indicates that under the most recent rules of scoring, 
stage 3 is the highest of Kohlberg's stages found among traditionally 
oriented adults from peasant societies. All three studies show sub- 
stantial amounts of stage 4 modes of reasoning among the university- 
educated portions of their samples. 
An explanation for all of these findings lies in the character of 
the stage 3 and 4 modes of reasoning. Built into the operational 
definitions of stages 3 and 4 are different assumptions about the 
nature of society. Stage 3 assumptions, I argue, correspond to the 
model of the face-to-face community, while those of stage 4 cor- 
respond to a state, or national, model. This can be demonstrated 
through an analysis that considers, on the one hand, some basic 
aspects of life in the two types of societies, and on the other hand, 
the ways in which stages 3 and 4 are differentiated from each other 
with respect to five basic moral "issues" or categories: (1) authority, 
(2) punishment, (3) rules and law, (4) guilt and blame, and (5) in- 
dividual liberty. Other issues besides these five might have been 
included; but this sample serves to show how modes of moral judg- 
ment may reflect the conditions of life in different kinds of societies. 
Excerpts from the Issue Scoring Manual (Kohlberg 1972) illustrate 
how the different moral issues are defined at stages 3 and 4. 
A face-to-face society, such as a tribal group, and a state or na- 
tional system differ in their institutions and processes of social con- 
trol. E. Adamson Hoebel (1954) discusses this problem with refer- 
ence to primitive versus civilized law. Hoebel states, "the more 
civilized man becomes, the greater is man's need for law, and the 
more law he creates" (1954:293). Simply to perform the functions 
of maintaining public order and resolving civil disputes, a state 
system requires more elaborate and formal legal institutions than 
does a tribal society. 
At the level of tribal society, most disputes or "trouble cases" can 
be settled with justice and dispatch by conference between the 
disputants, aided by respected clan or tribal elders who mediate the 
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case (Gluckman 1955, Bohannan 1957, Gulliver 1963). The medi- 
ators judge according to cultural norms that represent a flexible set 
of guidelines rather than a formal body of laws. The mediators' job 
involves more than simply weighing the evidence and deciding in 
favor of one side of the dispute or the other. The mediators must 
give justice where justice is due and at the same time create a work- 
able compromise that will be tolerated by both parties. They must 
take care to reestablish harmony in the community as well as up- 
hold the moral norms (Snell 1954, Saltman 1971) since no central 
authority exists to enforce the mediators' decision. 
A national state requires more formal and elaborate legal mech- 
anisms because of those social control problems inherent in urban- 
ization and the expansion of the social unit to a much larger scale 
(Hoebel 1954:327-329). In the first place, urbanization breaks 
down the organization based upon kinship and personal ties which 
is characteristic of tribal society. It thereby frees the individual 
from the control of his kinsmen and sets him among large groups 
of strangers. New mechanisms must be devised to take over the 
work of the kinship network. Allegiance to the state and the law 
must be forged out of loyalty and obedience to the clan. In the 
second place, when urban centers arise in multicultural societies, 
they function to bring together masses of people who have different 
backgrounds and also different values, goals, and life-styles. Value 
diversity proliferates in cities and brings with it a whole new series 
of social problems. Legal and moral conceptions must be developed 
to guide individuals in this complex situation. Both of these factors 
-the loss by the individual of the face-to-face community, and the 
heterogeneity of values encountered in the city-can be linked to 
the differences between stages 3 and 4 types of moral judgment. 
Urbanization loosens the ties between the individual and his 
kinship group and shifts the responsibility for controlling him from 
the face-to-face community to the "state." The state is an imperson- 
al and anonymous system as far as individuals are concerned. The 
authority of state officials over the individual rarely has any ele- 
ments of a personal relationship, as it always does in a face-to-face 
community, where the seniority and the leadership qualities of 
authorities naturally inspire respect. The impersonality of the state, 
however, requires that other reasons be developed for obeying gov- 
emnment officials. One possible reason is respect for the authority's 
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office and for the system that underlies that office. Here is the dis- 
tinction between the stage 3 and stage 4 ideas of respect for author- 
ity.. 
Stage 3. Respect for authority based on affection or belief in his personal 
virtue, his concern for subordinates, and what he has done in the past 
for them. 
Stage 4. An internal attitude of respect for authority is expected based 
on the authority representing society and order. 
(Kohlberg 1972: Tables Set A) 
When the responsibility for controlling the individual shifts 
from the face-to-face community to the state, the sanctioning agents 
for wrongdoing change from being the people in the community to 
institutionalized legal authorities. This transition can be linked 
to differences between stages 3 and 4 concepts of punishment and 
of rules and laws. In the tribal setting, the problems created by 
interpersonal disputes bring local groups into conflict and threaten 
to tear the community apart (Hoebel 1954). Therefore, the task of 
the mediators of a trouble-case is to work out a solution that will 
restore good relations between the plaintiff and his supporters and 
the defendant and his supporters. For example, in traditional cus- 
tomary Kipsigis law, a homicide case was settled when the clan of 
the murderers paid blood money to the clan of the victim. If the 
killer had murdered several times and was considered incorrigible 
by his clan, he would be abandoned to the vengeance of the victim's 
relatives. For the national state system, the responsibility for pun- 
ishing wrongdoers is vested not in the local community but in the 
state itself. Permanent institutions, in the form of police, courts, 
and prisons, exist to settle both the civil and criminal cases in the 
society. Hence it is a punishable offense for private groups to "take 
the law into their own hands" and seek their own vengeance. This 
distinction between tribal and state processes of conflict resolution 
is reflected in the stage 3 versus 4 concept of punishment: 
Stage 3. The function of punishment is to reform the culprit, to strength- 
en his desire to be good, and to restore his relations to the victim by 
repayment and forgiveness. 
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Stage 4. Punishment expresses the horror at the crime felt by law- 
abiding men, and is designed to teach that horror (or remorse) to the 
criminal. Crime is an offense against society, punishment is paying one's 
debt to society. 
(Kohlberg 1972: Issue G) 
Further, in the tribal setting, the rules that the mediators use to 
resolve disputes are flexible guidelines or norms that define duty 
and obligation for the social roles of the group. In contrast, for the 
state there is a fixed uniform code of law to give order across all of 
the disparate local regions within the society. This contrast is seen 
in the stage 3 versus stage 4 concept of rules and laws. 
Stage 3. Rules and laws are guides . . . to social or "good end seeking." 
They are guides to "being good." 
Stage 4. Rules and laws are a fixed system of general rules to be followed 
always, a system designed to prevent social disorder and chaos. Rules 
and laws define "right and wrong" categorically. 
(Kohlberg 1972: Tables Set A) 
A second feature of the state as opposed to the tribal society is 
the extreme heterogeneity of values of its citizens. As is clearly seen 
in Kenya today, urbanization throws together masses of people from 
different cultural backgrounds who disagree with each other on 
major as well as minor issues of morality. In a face-to-face commu- 
nity, where people tend to share many basic standards, it is reason- 
able to view wrongdoing as displeasing "the community." The 
moral individual does not want to offend the people among whom 
he has always lived and whose opinion he esteems. In the urban 
setting, however, standards are not even approximately shared and 
doing wrong cannot simply be a matter of offending "people's 
ideas." Instead, the moral individual might orient toward the 
imagined disapproval of people whose values he does accept. This 
audience could be somewhat abstract in constituency, as when a 
scientist thinks about "the community of science." Such a contrast 
is embodied in the distinction between the stage 3 and 4 concep- 
tions of guilt and blame. 
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Stage 3. Oriented to disapproval by others. This disapproval shades over 
into guilt in the sense that . . . [imagined disapproval may be] . . . 
motivating, even if it is [actually] possible to avoid detection. Concern 
about disapproval from authority or victim as reason for moral con- 
formity . . .depends for its potency upon a personal relationship to the 
person disapproving. 
Stage 4. A concern for loss of respect by one's peers or by disinterested 
members of the community; [this concern] is more or less identical with 
a loss of self-respect. Concern about other's respect is based on the fact 
that standards are shared with others. .. . Respect is different from ap- 
proval in being an impersonal judgment according to standards shared 
by the self. The validity of the respect of others rests upon its being 
based on standards shared or accepted by the self, and used by the self 
in judging others. 
(Kohlberg 1972: Issue B) 
The extreme heterogeneity of values in the urban setting can be 
traced to other ideas of morality besides guilt and blame. It also has 
links to ideas about rights of the individual. In the context of per- 
vasive value divergence, individuals must be provided some rea- 
sonable amount of freedom from interference by others who dis- 
like their religion, political views, life-styles, and so on. Society 
must define what is such a reasonable amount of freedom and then 
protect it through law. The domain of protected freedom can be 
called the "rights of the individual." The issue of protecting per- 
sonal liberty arises in a different way in a small community where 
people share certain general standards about good and bad conduct. 
For example, in a tribal society, people often disagree with each 
other but this occurs against the background of a certain minimal 
level of agreement about moral standards. Values about personal 
liberty, however, may still be important for a tribal society. People 
may be expected to grant each other enough autonomy to live their 
lives in peace. This value would be expressed in terms of refraining 
from malicious gossip and minding one's own business, not respect- 
ing people's "natural or human rights." Of course, personal liberty 
would not be considered to be unlimited. Sometimes it would be 
considered proper to intrude upon other's privacy-for example, 
when someone is secretly engaged in immoral conduct. The dis- 
tinction just elaborated between individual rights in the national 
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context versus reasonable liberty in the tribal setting, appears in 
the stage 3 versus 4 concept of liberty and civil rights. 
Stage 3. Issues of rights and liberty are subordinated to "nice" or hu- 
mane treatment of one person by another. One can infringe on the 
liberties of others for a prosocial purpose, and one's own liberties are 
restricted by the requirement that one be prosocial. 
Stage 4. Liberties are one of a class of rights deriving from society or 
guaranteed by society. These rights are "absolute" with regard to the 
whim or demands of another individual, but they are defined by society 
and may be restricted for the sake of social order and welfare. 
(Kohlberg 1972: Tables Set A) 
CONCLUSION 
The discussion has suggested why different modes of moral 
decision-making are appropriate for the tribal versus national 
frames of reference. In terms of Kohlberg's stage system of moral 
judgment, stage 3 is the type of thinking most suitable for a face- 
to-face community, while stage 4 is more suitable for the national 
state. Although stage 4 is considered more complex and differenti- 
ated than stage 3, it is not as a function of its greater cognitive dif- 
ficulty that it is more likely to be absent among peasant villagers 
than urban dwellers. Rather, stage 4 incorporates notions of author- 
ity, punishment, rules and law, guilt and blame, and individual 
liberty which are directly relevant to conditions of life in the urban 
context. An urban existence-with its anonymity, impersonality, 
and heterogeneity-presents moral problems that are not met in 
the face-to-face community. New mechanisms of social control are 
developed in the transition from tribal to civilized society, and new 
modes of moral judging may evolve as a result of the same social 
forces. Modes of moral judgment should be viewed as adaptive 
structures developed by people to accomplish important cognitive 
tasks at hand. They should not be seen as "achievements" for which 
"higher" is necessarily better. Insofar as we come to understand 
what are the cognitive requirements of life in different kinds of 
social environments, we will learn along what dimensions the pro- 
cesses of thought may differ from culture to culture, or even from 
subculture to subculture within a pluralistic society such as our 
own. 
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